Incorporating political-feasibility concerns into the assessment of India's clean-air policies by Peng, W. et al.
ArticleIncorporating political-feasibility concerns into the
assessment of India’s clean-air policiesGraphical abstractHighlightsd Clean-air policies in India have varying degrees of political
feasibility
d We assess how political feasibility affects air-quality and
climate impacts
d We develop a policy tool to integrate political and
environmental assessmentsPeng et al., 2021, One Earth 4, 1–12
August 20, 2021 ª 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2021.07.004Authors
Wei Peng, Sung Eun Kim,





Political feasibility is at the center of air-
pollution policymaking in the developing
world. We assess the political feasibility
of a wide range of clean-air policies in
India and find substantial variations. Such
variations have important implications for
real-world policy decisions, affecting
which policiesmight be selected and their
implementation outcomes. By
developing a policy tool (PACE-India) that
combines political and environmental
assessments, we highlight the
importance of political concerns in
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2021.07.004SCIENCE FOR SOCIETY Political feasibility is at the center of air-pollution policymaking in the developing
world, affecting both the choices of policies and their implementation outcomes. Using India as a test case,
we demonstrate how political considerations (e.g., public opinion, market structure, and government ca-
pacity) can be incorporated into quantitative models for environmental impact assessment. By examining
a wide range of clean-air policies across the electricity, industrial, transportation, residential, and agricul-
tural sectors, we find that policies with a great potential to mitigate air pollution can have varying degrees
of political feasibility. Because some lower-feasibility policies also co-reduce carbon emissions (e.g.,
phasing out existing coal units), considering the effects of political feasibility is particularly important in
achieving air-pollution and climate objectives simultaneously.SUMMARYPolitical-feasibility concerns are at the center of real-world air-pollution policymaking. Yet, these concerns are
often not represented in leading decision-support tools that have been used for assessing policies’ environ-
mental impacts. Focusing on a wide range of clean-air policies in India, we assess their political-feasibility
scoreson thebasisofpublicopinion,market, and institutional considerationsand then incorporate thesescores
into the evaluation of environmental impacts by using an integrated assessmentmodel (GAINS-SouthAsia).We
demonstrate that although somepolicieswith substantial potential tomitigate air pollution are also highly polit-
ically feasible (e.g., replacing solid fuels with cleaner fuels in households), others can be less politically feasible
(e.g., banning agricultural waste burning). Because someclean-air policies co-reduceCO2 emissions and aero-
sols, considering varying degrees of political feasibility is particularly important in achieving air-pollution and
climateobjectivessimultaneouslybecauseof its implicationson the implementationscale andpolicy sequence.INTRODUCTION
Air pollution is one of the leading public health threats to the
developing world. Exposure to air pollution leads to 6.7 million
premature deaths every year, of which half occur in China and In-
dia.1 A variety of measures have been proposed and imple-
mented to tackle air pollution, such as installing end-of-pipe con-
trols on power and industrial plants, switching to less-polluting
fuels, and improving efficiency to reduce energy use. From the
United States and Europe to China, the implementation of these
measures has contributed to noticeable improvements in air
quality and the associated health burden.2–4One Earth 4, 1–12,
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NAs countries take action to clean up the air, these measures
can simultaneously affect the global climate system. Some
strategies for tackling air pollution, such as switching from fos-
sil to renewable energy, reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions simultaneously.5–10 However, a net warming effect is
anticipated from removing all ambient aerosols,11–14 which is
a major type of air pollutant that affects surface warming by
blocking (cooling aerosols such as sulfate) or absorbing (warm-
ing aerosols such as black carbon) incoming sunlight. There-
fore, there is a growing emphasis among policymakers and an-
alysts on coordinating the efforts to tackle air pollution and
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(2021), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2021.07.004Nevertheless, real-world policy decisions are almost never
made entirely on the basis of environmental considerations. In
fact, political feasibility remains at the center of policymaking
and affects both the implementation success and the policy
sequence.15 First, policies with stronger political support are
generally more successful in implementation. Even when policy
measures have substantial technical potential tomitigate air pollu-
tion, governments are unlikely to fully implement the policies if they
lack institutional capacity or face strongopposition from the public
and interest groups.16 For instance, although India introduced a
ban on stubble burning in 2015,17 the law enforcement has been
lax given that no political party is willing to support the crop-
burning ban that is likely to antagonize the farming lobby.18 Sec-
ond, policies that are more politically feasible are often chosen to
be implemented first. For instance, China prioritized end-of-pipe
control strategies tocleanup theair initially and later turned tostra-
tegies for reducing coal consumption. This is largely because
installing end-of-pipe controls reduces air pollution while allowing
for a continued dependence on coal. The former strategy caused
less disruption to domestic coal interest groups than the latter
strategy, which requires a transition away from coal.19
Yet the decision-support tools that have been used for assess-
ing air-pollution policies often lack the ability to model political
considerations. Although these tools are good at characterizing
physical factors (such as technology costs and emissions) and
natural processes (such as atmospheric transport and chemistry
processes), they are poor at representing political factors that
shape actual policy choices and implementation outcomes in
the real world. Indeed, somemodels have started to add political
aspects,20,21 but the examples are few. Bringing together a team
of modelers and political scientists, we contribute to filling this
gap by adding assessment of political feasibility to the quantita-
tivemodeling frameworks for environmental impact assessment.
Our goal is to increase the utility of these models to inform real-
world decisions.
Here, we use India as a test case. India suffers from the worst
air quality in the world, such that 1.7 million people die prema-
turely from exposure to ambient and indoor air pollution in
2019.1 To tackle the toxic air, the Indian government launched
the National Clean Air Program in 2019, aiming for 20%–30%
reduction of PM2.5 (particulate matter % 2.5 mm) and PM10 con-
centration by 2024 relative to 2017 levels.22 At the same time, In-
dia is a major player in the global climate challenge. It is already
the world’s third largest GHG emitter, and its emissions are ex-
pected to increase rapidly in the coming decades with a growing
economy and energy demand.23 Finally, India’s political system
is an important ‘‘tough case’’ for political feasibility given that the
Indian federal structure is highly decentralized and reforms have
proved difficult.24 Lessons about success and failure of policy
implementation in India can be applied to other democratic
countries with decentralized governance structures, from Brazil
and Mexico to Indonesia.
Methodologically, we develop a policy tool (Political Assess-
ment of Clean air and Environmental Policies for India [PACE-In-
dia]) to integrate political and environmental assessments on the
basis of the following steps:
(1) Use a state-level integrated assessment model (GAINS-
South Asia, available at http://gains.iiasa.ac.at) to project2 One Earth 4, 1–12, August 20, 2021the air-pollution and climate impacts of implementing 35
clean-air policies across the power, industry, transporta-
tion, residential, and agricultural sectors in 2030 by
assuming successful implementation to their maximum
technical feasibility (see more in Note S1); we then select
the top 12 policies with the greatest potential to mitigate
air pollution for further analysis.
(2) Assess the political-feasibility score for each of the 12 pol-
icieson thebasisofsix keymetrics related topublicopinion,
market structure, and government capacity that have been
identified to be critical in the political-economy literature.
(3) Re-assess the air-quality and climate impacts of each
policy by adjusting the plausible implementation scale
on the basis of their political feasibility.
(4) Compare different sequences to implement these policy
measures to prioritize air-pollution or political-feasibility
considerations.
(5) Identify a desirable set of policies to achieve different
combinations of air-pollution and climate targets.
This policy tool is available as Data S1 and from online database;
steps 1 and 2 are user-specified inputs, and steps 3–5 are
model-calculated outputs.RESULTS
Twelve policies with the greatest potential to mitigate
air pollution
Among the 35 policies included in our initial assessment, the 12
policies with the largest potential tomitigate nationwide air pollu-
tion, on the basis of maximum technical feasibility, are summa-
rized in Table 1. Implementing these 12 policies can realize
90% of the total mitigation potential of all 35 policies (see Note
S1 and Table S2 for the full list of 35measures and their impacts).
Although a careful evaluation of all current policies goes beyond
the scope of our analysis, our selection of policies covers a wide
range of key policies across all major emitting sectors, hence
providing useful information to inform future priority setting and
policy design.
A few of these policies are already high on the Indian govern-
ment’s agenda, as supported by a series of recent welfare pol-
icies and air-pollution control policies, including (1) Pradhan
Mantri Ujjwala Yojana (PMUY), which provides 80.34 million liq-
uefied petroleum gas (LPG) connections to poor households25,26
(RES-1); (2) the Swachh Bharat Mission, which built 110 million
toilets between 2014 and 2019 to end open defecation26,27
(RES-2); (3) eliminating all crop-residue burning26 (AGR-2); and
(4) scaling up renewable energy capacity to 175 GW by 202226
(POW-1).Political-feasibility scores
On the basis of the political-economy literature, we consider six
metrics in three dimensions (Table 2; for more details, see the
experimental procedures):
(1) Public opinion: successful policy implementation requires
support from the public; here, we consider one metric to
evaluate whether the costs of policy implementation are
directly borne by the public.
Table 1. Twelve clean-air policies with the largest mitigation potential among the 35 policies included in the initial assessment
Sector Abbreviation Description
Power POW-1 use incentives to foster extended use of wind, solar, biomass or bagasse, and hydro power
for electricity generation and phase out the least efficient coal power plants
POW-2 introduce state-of-the-art end-of-pipe measures to reduce NOx emissions from power
plants
Industry IND-1 introduce state-of-the-art end-of-pipe measures to reduce SO2 and particulate-matter
emissions from large-scale industries
IND-2 encourage centralizedwaste collection with source separation and treatment, including gas
utilization
IND-3 introduce state-of-the-art end-of-pipe measures to reduce NOx emissions from large-scale
industries
IND-4 reduce process emissions by upgrading brick kilns to modern technologies
Transportation TRA-1 seal unpaved road surfaces to reduce fugitive dust from unpaved roads
TRA-2 enforce mandatory checks and repairs of vehicles
Residential RES-1 use clean fuels (such as LPG and advanced stoves) for cooking and heating
RES-2 strictly enforce bans on the open burning of household waste
Agriculture AGR-1 use urease inhibitors and/or substitute with, for example, ammonium nitrate for more
efficient application of fertilizer
AGR-2 strictly enforce bans on the open burning of agricultural residues
For more information, see Table S1.
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(2021), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2021.07.004(2) Market structure: policy implementation is often easier if it
is compatible with the current market structure; here, we
include three metrics that measure the expected benefits
and costs for themarket, the degree of market concentra-
tion, and the presence of organized interests.
(3) Government capacity: stronger capacity often yields bet-
ter implementation outcomes; here, we consider twomet-
rics that measure government concentration and institu-
tional capacity, respectively.
We highlight three issues related to our selection of metrics.
First, in this work we focus on political feasibility instead of polit-
ical will. Political will reflects the government’s level of interest in
the outcomes that a successful policy reform would generate.
Political feasibility, in contrast, is a measure of whether a moti-
vated government can carry out these policy reforms. As such,
political will should be separated from political feasibility,38 and
we focus specifically on political feasibility in our assessment.
Second, we include institutional capacity as a stand-alone metric
to capture the challenge of implementing policies evenwhen they
have broad political support. Although institutional capacity is not
sufficient for policy implementation in the absence of political
support, it is necessary for success, especially where policy im-
plementation is complicated. The 12 policies on our list fit the
bill because they require financing, regulatory changes, coordina-
tion, and enforcement over time. Therefore, considering institu-
tional capacity is important for understanding the likelihood that
a government succeeds in carrying out an emission-reducing pol-
icy change. We also note that institutional capacity is to some
extent endogenous given that governments can invest in capabil-
ities in policy areas that they consider important.39 Capacity
building is a complex and lengthy process, however, and pre-
existing institutional capacity is an important consideration in
policy implementation. Finally, we do not include the potential
scope of rent seeking on our list of political-feasibility attributesbecause the literature on rent seeking does not generate clear
predictions about the effect of rent-seeking potential on political
feasibility.40 On the one hand, rent seeking can be detrimental
when it takes the form of corruption and undermines the quality
of public works. For example, a road-paving or waste-manage-
ment project could be compromised by bribery that allows low-
quality contractors to win bids. On the other hand, rent seeking
could ‘‘grease the wheels’’ and motivate bureaucrats to approve
projects. For example, road paving could be politically feasible
specifically because both major infrastructure construction firms
and powerful local politicians expect rents from it. Although such
projects might not be optimal or cost effective, corruption could
lead to emission-reduction activities that would otherwise not
get through the political system. Given this lack of definite
predictions, we view rent seeking as an important area of future
research.
We find the degrees of political feasibility to vary significantly
across different clean-air policies with scores ranging from 2 to
12 (Figure 1; see experimental procedures for the general mean-
ing of the scores and Note S2 for detailed justification for each
score for each policy). This is because these measures impose
costs on different industrial sectors, affect exposure to air pollu-
tion in different communities, and are implemented through
different government agencies with varying degrees of institu-
tional capacity.
The two policies with the highest political-feasibility scores are
RES-1 (i.e., use clean fuels such as LPG and advanced stoves for
cooking and heating) and AGR-1 (i.e., improve fertilizer applica-
tion practices) because they score highly in all aspects of public
opinion, market structure, and government capacity. The high
scoring for these two policies is consistent with their relatively
successful implementation in the real world. For RES-1, India
has a massive national program, PMUY, to expand the use of
LPG to all households. By subsidizing installation charges and
cylinder deposit, this program does not impose any costs onOne Earth 4, 1–12, August 20, 2021 3
Table 2. Six metrics on political feasibility
Political-economy considerations Metrics Interpretation
Relevant political-economy
literature
Public opinion popular opposition when the costs of implementing a
policy are directly borne by the
public, the policy is more likely to
face strong popular resistance
Benes et al.,28 Cheon et al.,29
Overland30
Market structure market benefit or cost when the affected industry expects
benefits or costs from the policy
implementation, the policy is more
or less, respectively, likely to be
supported by the industry
Benes et al.,28 Busby and Shidore,31
Busby et al.32
market concentration when the affected industry is
characterized by a small number of
producers and product lines,
emission mitigation will be more
feasible from a collective-action
perspective
Busby and Shidore,31 Busby et al.,32
Olson,33 Mitchell34
organized interests the presence of an organized
interest group representing the
affected industry will make
implementing a policy easier or
more difficult when the industry
expects benefits or costs,
respectively
Benes et al.,28 Bernhagen,35
Grossman and Helpman36
Government capacity government concentration when the authority over rulemaking
and policy-implementation activities
are fully centralized, the degree of
government concentration is high,
which is often beneficial for effective
policymaking and implementation;
when they are under the control of
state governments with or without
coordination with the central
government, government
concentration is medium or low,
respectively
Busby and Shidore,31 Busby et al.,32
Tsebelis37
institutional capacity stronger institutional capacity





Please cite this article in press as: Peng et al., Incorporating political-feasibility concerns into the assessment of India’s clean-air policies, One Earth
(2021), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2021.07.004households, while producers are directly controlled by the cen-
tral government.41 Studies found that this program indeed
encouraged the adoption ofmodern cooking gas, although its ef-
fect on regular use of LPG remains questionable.42 For AGR-1,
improving the efficiency of fertilizer application involves technical
solutions that carry little cost, provided that government support
is available. The fertilizer market is highly concentrated, and
government capacity to control it is plentiful. In fact, urea is a
controlled fertilizer that is highly subsidized at present—the dif-
ference between the cost of production and a fixed selling price
is now paid as a subsidy to manufacturers. To close the price
gap between agricultural and industrial uses and also reduce
the use of urea, the Indian government announced a resolution
for 100% mandatory neem coating of urea in 2015.43 The use
of neem-coated urea can decrease the urea requirement while
increasing the efficiency of nitrogen fertilizer, which brings the
environmental benefits of reducing air pollutants and GHG emis-
sions. It also checked the pilferage of heavily subsidized urea by
the chemical industry and other applications.4 One Earth 4, 1–12, August 20, 2021In comparison, the three policies with the lowest political-feasi-
bility scores are POW-2 (i.e., introducingNOx [nitrogen oxide] con-
trol on power plants) and RES-2 and AGR-2 (bans on open
burning of residential waste and agricultural residues, respec-
tively). Indeed, we observe implementation challenges for these
three policies in India. Regarding POW-2, the political difficulty
of controlling air pollution frompower plants, especially NOx emis-
sions, is readily seen in recent developments. Despite the strin-
gent emission standards released in 201544 (i.e., 300 mg/Nm3
for NOx emissions), power companies continue to claim that this
standard is infeasible without the use of sophisticated and expen-
sive technologies such as selective catalytic reduction and selec-
tive non-catalytic reduction.45 As a consequence, the Supreme
Court of India recently relaxed the limits for coal-fired power sta-
tions commissioned between December 2003 and 2016 from 300
to 450mg/Nm3.46Because of the cost of retrofitting pollution-con-
trol technology and the lack of rigorous enforcement, coal-fired
power plants continue to violate the emission rules. Regarding
RES-2, given that Indian cities currently burn 2%–24% of their
Figure 1. Political feasibility score for the 12 clean-air policies
Darker blue or black indicates a higher political-feasibility score. We give a score of 1, 1, or 0 if a given dimension is favorable, unfavorable, or neither,
respectively, for policy implementation in terms of political feasibility. See the general meaning of the scores in Table 4. A detailed justification for each numerical
score for each policy is presented in Note S2. Alternative political-feasibility scores as a robustness check are reported in Notes S4–S6 and Figures S1–S3. The
descriptions of the 12 measures are included in Tables 1 and S1.
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(2021), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2021.07.004generated waste per day,47 municipal waste burning is a major
contributor to regional air pollution, especially in urban areas.48,49
Poorwaste-collection efficiency results in the burning ofmunicipal
solid waste. The management of household waste is one of the
main functions of urban local bodies (ULBs). Although ULBs are
required for planning, implementing, and monitoring all systems
for managing municipal solid waste, they are constantly striving
to meet this challenge with limited financial resources, technical
capacities, and land availability. Moreover, a lack of centralized
authority results in a patchwork of fragmented policies that often
face public opposition because of the costs to the population.
Regarding AGR-2, stopping the fires would be costly given that
farmers are a politically powerful group. Farmers are spread
across the countryside with little concentration and agricultural
residue fires cross state boundaries. The government has little ca-
pacity to enforce policies in this sector. In fact, there has already
been a ban on burning agricultural residue, but state authorities
have not been able to entirely stop it. Every year, the air quality
in North India deteriorates rapidly when farmers begin to burn
the stubble to clear their fields for the next harvest.50 For instance,
according to satellite data, there were 61,332 instances of stubble
burning in Punjab, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh between October
and November 2019.51
In this study, we test the robustness of our political-feasibility
scores by using an alternative weighting method that gives an
equal weight to the three dimensions (public opinion, market
structure, and government capacity) instead of the six metrics.
We find that the measures with the highest and lowest feasibility
scores remain robust (see Notes S4–S6 and Figures S1–S3).Furthermore, recognizing that different decision makers and
policy analysts could have different views and assessments,
the PACE-India policy tool developed along with this paper al-
lows users to provide their own political-feasibility scores, as
well as other choices on political insights and policy targets
that would be relevant for later sections (for more details, see
the discussion, experimental procedures, and Data S1).Air-pollution and climate impacts of individual policies
By comparing the policy implementation scenarios with a no-
policy scenario that considers only current legislation, we project
the nationwide impacts of implementing each individual policy
on air pollution (measured by national average exposure level
to particulate matter in mg/m3) and climate (measured in CO2eq
[carbon dioxide equivalent] based on GWP100 [100-year global
warming potential]) in 2030. Given the environmental impacts
of a policy change with the implementation scale,52 we consider
two implementation levels in this paper (note that more options
are available in the PACE-India policy tool):
(1) Full implementation to its maximum technical feasibility
(e.g., for RES-1, this means that all households will use
clean fuels such as LPG and advanced stoves for cooking
and heating; assumptions for all 12 policies are summa-
rized in Table S1);
(2) Partial implementation assuming a lower implementation
rate for policies with a lower political-feasibility score.
For simplicity, here we present the result for a linear
case where the implementation scale increases fromOne Earth 4, 1–12, August 20, 2021 5
Figure 2. National total air-pollution and
climate impacts in 2030 from implementing
each of the 12 clean-air policies, as ranked
from high (left) to low (right) political-feasi-
bility score
Changes in impacts relative to a no-policy scenario
that considers only current legislation. The filled
circles indicate the impacts with full implementation
to their maximum technical feasibility, and the open
circles indicate partial implementation assuming
that the implementation rate increases linearly with
political-feasibility score (i.e., the implementation
rate increases from 0% to 90% as the political-
feasibility score increases from 0 to 12). The light-
blue areas indicate potential benefits for air quality
(a reduction in national average exposure level to
particulate matter) or for climate (i.e., a reduction in
warming effects). The light-yellow area indicates
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0 to 12. To test alternative shapes, PACE-India also in-
cludes four non-linear functional forms to characterize
the relationship between political feasibility and the
implementation scale (e.g., see Notes S7–S9 and Figures
S4–S6 for the results assuming a convex and concave
relationship). Although immediately achieving a high im-
plementation rate is challenging given the low starting
point at present, it is often an attainable goal in a 10- to
20-year time horizon if it is supported by appropriate
policies and interventions. If we take RES-1 as an
example, only 48% of India’s population had access to
clean cooking fuels or technologies in 2018, but with
strong policy support, the penetration level by 2030 is ex-
pected to reach 90% or higher.53
With full implementation (filled circles in Figure 2), some policies
that are highly politically feasible also have a great potential to
reduce nationwide exposure to air pollution. For instance, RES-1
(i.e., cleaner fuel for cooking and heating) ranks the highest for
both the political-feasibility score and the mitigation potential for
air-pollution impacts.Yet,otherpolicieswith largepotential tomiti-
gate air pollution are less politically feasible. For instance, AGR-2
(i.e., bans on the open burning of agricultural residues) is among
the policies with the lowest political-feasibility scores despite the
substantial air-quality benefits from implementing this policy. In
comparison, with partial implementation (open circles), the air-6 One Earth 4, 1–12, August 20, 2021quality benefits almost always decrease
with the political-feasibility scores because
lower political feasibility reduces the imple-
mentation scale and hence the associated
improvement in air quality. As such, when
the implementation rate is affected by polit-
ical feasibility, the ranking of the 12 policies
basedon their political feasibility is similar to
their ranking based on air-quality benefits.
The climate impacts from most clean-
air policies are small, except for twopolicies: (1) IND-1 (i.e., SO2 and PM control in large-scale in-
dustry), for which a climate co-harm is expected because of
the warming effects from removing inorganic cooling aerosols;
and (2) POW-1 (i.e., switching to renewables and phasing out
inefficient coal units), for which a climate co-benefit is ex-
pected given that increasing zero-emitting renewable power
co-reduces GHG emissions. With full implementation, IND-1
increases 2030 GHG emissions by 0.25 billion tons of
CO2eq, whereas POW-1 decreases GHG emissions by 1.75
billion tons of CO2eq. The climate impacts of all the measures
for partial implementation are lower than for full implemen-
taion as a result of the reduced implementation scale. The
difference between full and partial implementation is larger
for POW-1 than for IND-1 because POW-1 has a lower politi-
cal-feasibility score, which results in a greater reduction in the
implementation rate and associated climate impacts under
partial implementation.
Policy sequences and the cumulative environmental
impacts
To assess the cumulative impacts of implementing all 12 pol-
icies, we consider three plausible sequences grounded in real-
world contexts (Figure 3; note that more options are available
in the PACE-India policy tool).
d Sequence 1: from high to low air-quality benefits,
assuming full implementation
Table 3. Desirable sets of policies for achieving varying combinations of air-pollution and climate objectives
Air-pollution objective
Moderate target (i.e., reducing
national average exposure by
5.6 mg/m3)
Ambitious target (i.e., reducing
national average exposure by
11.1 mg/m3)
Climate objective no consideration d sequence 1: first policy
d sequence 2: first policy
d sequence 3: first two policies
d sequence 1: first five policies
d sequence 2: first five policies
d sequence 3: unattainable
moderate consideration (i.e.,
cumulative climate impact is non-
warming)
d sequence 1: first five policies
d sequence 2: first nine policies
d sequence 3: unattainable
strict consideration (i.e., excluding
policies with climate co-harms)
d sequence 1: first policy
d sequence 2: first policy
d sequence 3: first and fifth policies
unattainable by sequence 1, 2, or 3
Sequence 1: from high to low air-quality benefits, assuming full implementation. Sequence 2: from high to low political feasibility, assuming full imple-
mentation. Sequence 3: from high to low air-quality benefits, assuming partial implementation. See Note S3 and Table S3 for the detailed lists of pol-
icies following each sequence.
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full implementation
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assuming partial implementation based on political feasi-
bility
Sequence 1 can be viewed as the optimal path to tackling air
pollution with no consideration of political feasibility, implementa-
tion challenge, or climate impacts. Sequence 2 is the most politi-
cally feasible path but does not prioritize air-quality or climate con-
siderations; it also assumes that political feasibility affects only the
sequence to implement these policies and not the implementation
scale of each policy. Sequence 3 integrates the considerations of
both air-pollution benefits and political feasibility; it prioritizes the
policies that bring greater air-quality benefits under partial imple-
mentation, which are often the policies that are more politically
feasible. Here, we further assume that the cumulative impacts
are a linear addition of the impacts of each individual policy,
although in reality the atmospheric chemistry processes and the
transport of pollution can introduce non-linearities (see, e.g., prior
studies from China8,54 and India55).
For these 12 policies to be implemented one after another, the
cumulative reduction in air-quality impacts is slightly smaller un-
der sequence 2 (based on political feasibility) than under
sequence 1 (based on air-quality impacts) until all 12 policies
are implemented. This is because some policies that are more
politically feasible bring less air-quality benefit (for instance, in-
dustrial measures, IND-2 to IND-4). With partial implementation
(sequence 3), given that low political feasibility also reduces
the implementation scale, the ranking based on air-pollution im-
pacts is similar to the ranking based on political feasibility. As
such, the shape of the line for sequence 3 is similar to that of
sequence 2, although the magnitude of the air-quality benefits
is smaller as a result of partial implementation.
The variations across the three sequences are muchmore sig-
nificant for their cumulative climate impacts. Although the net im-
pacts of implementing all 12 policies are a net cooling effect (i.e.,
climate benefits), only two policies have substantial impacts on
climate: one with co-benefits (POW-1) and one with co-harms
(IND-1). The cumulative climate impacts largely depend onwhen these two policies are implemented. In particular, because
POW-1 (i.e., switching to renewables and phasing out inefficient
coal units) is the key strategy for co-reducing CO2 emissions, the
cumulative climate impacts remain a warming effect until POW-1
is implemented. As such, given that the political-feasibility
ranking of POW-1 is relatively low, the cumulative climate im-
pacts become a net cooling effect at a later stage for sequence
2 or 3 (based on their political feasibility or air-quality impacts
with partial implementation) than for sequence 1 (based on their
air-quality impacts assuming full implementation).
Interactions between policy sequences and policy
targets
Despite close connections, mitigating air pollution andmitigating
climate change are still largely viewed as two distinctive policy
targets in India and elsewhere. Here, we identify the choices
and sequences of clean-air policies that can best deliver
different combinations of policy targets for air pollution and
climate mitigation. For air pollution, we consider a moderate
target and an ambitious target, measured as one-third and
two-thirds, respectively, of the maximum reduction potential
from fully implementing all 12 policies (i.e., a reduction in national
average PM2.5 exposure of 5.6 and 11.1 mg/m
3, respectively). For
the climate objective, we consider three levels of stringency: (1)
no consideration, where climate concerns are completely
ignored; (2) moderate consideration, where the cumulative
climate impacts need to be non-warming; and (3) strict consider-
ation, where policies with climate co-harms (i.e., those policies in
the light-yellow area in Figure 2B) are excluded from implemen-
tation. Then, for each of the three sequences discussed in the
previous section (‘‘policy sequences and the cumulative environ-
mental impacts’’), we identify the sets of policies that need to be
implemented to achieve these different combinations of air-
pollution and climate targets (Table 3).
To achieve a moderate air-pollution target, fully implement-
ing RES-1 (i.e., cleaner fuel for cooking and heating), which
has the highest political-feasibility score and the greatest
air-quality benefits, can already be successful. Given that
switching to clean fuels for heating and cooking also reduces
CO2 emissions, fully implementing RES-1 contributes to theOne Earth 4, 1–12, August 20, 2021 7
Figure 3. Cumulative impacts of different se-
quences to implement the 12 clean-air pol-
icies
Cumulative national air-pollution (A) and climate (B)
impacts in 2030 from implementing the 12 clean-air
policies according to three sequences: (1) from high
to low air-quality benefits, assuming full im-
plementation (dark red); (2) from high to low political
feasibility, assuming full implementation (gray); and
(3) from high to low air-quality benefits, assuming
partial implementation based on political feasibility
(orange-red). The light-blue areas indicate potential
benefits for air quality (a reduction in national
average exposure level to particulate matter) or for
climate (i.e., a reduction in warming effects). The
light-yellow area indicates potential co-harms for
the climate (i.e., an increase in warming effects). The
detailed sequences for the 12 policies are pre-
sented in Note S3 and Table S3.
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parison, with partial implementation, the moderate air-pollu-
tion target can be achieved by implementing both RES-1
and AGR-1 (i.e., improving efficiency of fertilizer application),
which is consistent with no or moderate climate consideration
(i.e., cumulative climate impacts are non-warming). However,
AGR-1 leads to a slight increase in N2O emissions as a warm-
ing gas. Thus, under a strict climate consideration, one needs
to skip this policy and implement the next available policy,
POW-1 (i.e., increase renewable electricity and phase out
inefficient coal units).
In contrast, to achieve an ambitious air-pollution target, many
more policies need to be fully implemented (i.e., under se-
quences 1 and 2). In fact, with partial implementation (i.e., polit-
ical-feasibility concerns reduce the implementation scale under
sequence 3), the ambitious air-pollution target cannot be met
even when all 12 policies are implemented.
Furthermore, when an ambitious air-pollution target is com-
bined with a moderate or strict climate target, the options
become extremely constrained or even non-existent. For
instance, to achieve an ambitious air-pollution target with no
climate consideration, five policies need to be fully implemented
under sequence 1 (based on air-quality benefits) or sequence 2
(based on political feasibility). With moderate climate consider-
ation, the choices of the five policies remain the same for
sequence 1 (based on air-quality benefits); however, one needs
to implement the top nine policies under sequence 2 (based on
political feasibility) to ensure non-warming effects cumulatively,
and implementing these nine policies will overachieve the mod-
erate air-pollution target. Finally, with strict climate consider-
ation, none of the three sequences can achieve the ambitious
air-pollution goal given that IND-1, the policy with climate co-
harms but substantial air-quality benefits, has to be excluded.
In summary, our analysis indicates that considering the im-
pacts of political feasibility on policy sequence and implementa-
tion rate matters the most in achieving an ambitious air-pollution
target coupled with a strict climate consideration. This finding
underscores that political-feasibility considerations will become
particularly important when air-pollution and climate concerns
are to be addressed simultaneously.8 One Earth 4, 1–12, August 20, 2021DISCUSSION
Using India as a test case, we demonstrate that different clean-
air policies have varying degrees of political feasibility, which in
turn affects their implementation scale and the desirable set of
policies for achieving policy targets. Some policies with substan-
tial air-quality benefits are also highly politically feasible, such as
switching to cleaner fuels for cooking and heating in households.
Other policies seem to be less politically feasible, such as ban-
ning the open burning of residential and agricultural waste.
Therefore, our results identify the clean-air policies that might
need additional efforts to overcome political barriers in order to
ensure their implementation success and to achieve the associ-
ated improvement in air quality.
In addition, our analysis underscores that political-feasibility
concerns are especially critical when the government aims to
achieve an ambitious air-pollution control target in combination
with some level of climate consideration. Substantial improve-
ment in air quality requires mitigation efforts across all economic
sectors, including the implementation of policies that could be
less politically feasible. Some air-pollution control measures
could bring climate co-benefits (e.g., switching to renewable
electricity), whereas others lead to climate co-harms (e.g.,
reducing industrial SO2 emissions and associated cooling aero-
sols). Simultaneously addressing climate concerns will require
implementing climate-friendly clean-air policies that are less
politically feasible and avoiding climate-unfriendly policies that
could be more politically feasible. In the case of India, retiring
coal-fired power plants (POW-1) is one such example that is
necessary for ensuring a positive climate impact while cleaning
up the air, despite its low political feasibility and critical imple-
mentation challenges. Without this policy, an effective sequence
of policies to reduce air pollution could come at the expense of
unsatisfying climate outcomes.
Our study takes a critical step toward integrating political con-
siderations into the environmental impact assessment of pol-
icies. Although our political-feasibility scores are assessed on
the basis of key insights from the political-economy literature,
different policymakers and analysts could have different per-
spectives on a policy’s political feasibility. These scores could
Table 4. General meaning of –1, 0, and +1 scoring
Political-economy
considerations Metrics
Interpretation of the scores
1 (unfavorable)
0 (neither favorable nor
unfavorable) +1 (favorable)
Public opinion popular opposition the public directly bears
the costs of policy
implementation
N/A the public does not bear
the costs of policy
implementation










market concentration the affected sector is not
concentrated (i.e.,
characterized by a large
number of producers and
product lines that
contribute to emissions)
N/A the affected sector is
concentrated (i.e.,
characterized by a small
number of producers and
product lines that
contribute to emissions)
organized interests the industry expects
costs and is represented
by organized interest
groups, or the industry










groups, or the industry






the government is not
concentrated





institutional capacity the government has low
institutional capacity (i.e.,
administrative apparatus
for implementing a given
policy)




for implementing a given
policy)
the government has high
institutional capacity (i.e.,
administrative apparatus
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ronments evolve. To embrace diverse opinions and provide a
transparent platform for such debates, the PACE-India policy
tool allows users to (1) provide their own political-feasibility score
for each policy, (2) specify howpolitical feasibility could affect the
implementation scale, (3) choose the ranking method to decide
the policy sequence, and (4) set the policy targets for mitigating
air pollution and climate change. On the basis of the political in-
sights and policy targets specified by users, the tool will demon-
strate how thesechoiceswill affect thedecisionsonclean-air pol-
icies and the resulting implications on air quality and climate.
PACE-India thus provides a concrete example of combining po-
litical and environmental assessments in aquantitative and trans-
parent manner. By enabling users to offer their own insights, it
also creates an opportunity to generate actionable knowledge
to inform real-world policies that are both politically viable and
environmentally friendly.
To encourage further integration of the political economy and
environmental modeling communities, we highlight three direc-
tions of future research for India and globally. First, given that
state governments are leading many of the policymaking and im-
plementation efforts in India, incorporating local factors to assesspolitical feasibility at the state level would be useful in providing
relevant information for decision makers on the ground. We
have treated India as a national unit and have only considered
center-state interactions insofar as they affect the integration or
fragmentation of markets and regulations. In reality, different In-
dian states face very different circumstances. Second, although
wedonot assess theeconomic cost of implementingeachpolicy,
high costs are often a critical obstacle, especially for large-scale
implementation. We encourage future research to add cost
consideration, especially how the costs could evolve in the future
in response to technology innovation and economy of scale (e.g.,
learning by doing). These costs estimates can, in turn, improve
our estimation of political feasibility given that low costs tend to
encourage deployment. Finally, here we use simple assumptions
toassess in a stylizedway the impacts of political feasibility on the
implementation scale and policy sequence. Other forms of policy
intervention, such as subsidy programs, can overcome the polit-
ical barriers and increase implementation. The policies analyzed
here can also be considered in their constituent parts. For
example, the political difficulties of moving away from coal
stem far less from adding renewable power-generation capacity
and more from displacing coal-fired power-generation capacity.One Earth 4, 1–12, August 20, 2021 9
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(2021), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2021.07.004In addition, multiple policies are often implemented simulta-
neously to achieve air-pollution goals instead of strictly one after
another, as we assume in this study. Future studies should
consider these dynamics in amore sophisticated way to improve
the representation of policymaking and implementation pro-




Further information and requests for resources should be directed to and will
be fulfilled by the lead contact, Dr. Wei Peng (weipeng@psu.edu).
Materials availability
This study did not generate new unique materials.
Data and code availability
All relevant data and codes are included in the Excel-based policy tool
PACE-India. This tool is available as Data S1 and from the online database:
Peng, Wei (2021), ‘‘PACE-India’’, Mendeley Data, V1, https://doi.org/10.
17632/nngbkydf95.1. The GAINS-South Asia model can be accessed at
https://gains.iiasa.ac.at/models/.
Assessment of air-pollution and climate impacts
We used a state-level integrated assessment model, GAINS-South Asia, to
assess the impacts on air pollution and GHG emissions on the basis of 2030
projections of socioeconomic patterns, energy system changes, and air-pollu-
tion strategies. The GAINSmodel quantifies the emissions and impacts of nine
air pollutants (SO2, NOx, PM2.5, PM10, black carbon, organic carbon, CO, NH3,
and volatile organic compounds) and six GHGs (CO2, CH4, N2O, hydrofluoro-
carbons, perfluorocarbons, and SF6). The model explores the impacts of more
than 1,500 specific measures on multiple air pollutants and GHGs, identifies
trade-offs and win-win measures, and assesses their impacts on ambient air
quality, population exposure, and various climate metrics. The GAINS model
has been utilized for government consultations and in a wide range of aca-
demic publications to assess the impacts of air pollution and climate
change.3,56–60 A detailed description of the GAINS-South Asia model is
included in the supplemental experimental procedures.
Following the methodology and assumptions in UNEP (2019),61 we as-
sessed the impacts of implementing each individual policy to its maximum
technical feasibility by comparing it with a current legislation scenario. The
detailed assumptions for maximum technical feasibility are summarized in Ta-
ble S1. The projections of future economic activity, energy use, and agricul-
tural production are derived from the 2016 World Energy Outlook Special
Report: Energy and Air Pollution.62 For air-pollution impacts, GAINS-South
Asia uses a state-level source-receptor matrix derived from the atmospheric
chemistry and transport model, European Monitoring and Evaluation Pro-
gramme, to evaluate the impacts of emissions on ambient pollution. We
used the national average exposure level to ambient and indoor particulate
matter to estimate the air-pollution impacts (measured in mg/m3). For climate
impacts, we used the long-term radiative forcing estimates for GHGs and
aerosols to calculate the aggregate radiative forcing effects (measured in
CO2eq, assuming GWP100). Although these impacts were assessed at the state
level, we aggregated them to the national level for our main results.
To consider the impacts of partial implementation when political feasibility
affects the implementation rate, we present a linear case whereby the imple-
mentation scale increases from 0% to 90% as the political-feasibility score in-
creases from 0 to 12. Four alternative non-linear relationships are available
from the PACE-India tool, two of which are presented in Notes S7–S9 and Fig-
ures S4–S6. We assume that the air-pollution and climate impacts scale up
proportionally with the implementation scale (i.e., 90% implementation leads
to 90%of the impacts). This assumption could result in uncertainties as a result
of the non-linear formation of secondary aerosols from primary emissions as
well as the non-linear transport of pollution.8,54,55
Assessment of political feasibility
We measured the political-feasibility score for each policy by adding the
scores of six metrics: public opinion, market benefit, market concentration,10 One Earth 4, 1–12, August 20, 2021organized interests, government concentration, and institutional capacity.
These six metrics represent three types of political-economy considerations:
public opinion, market structure, and government capacity. Table 4 explains
the general meaning of 1, 0, and +1 scoring. Justification and reasoning in
support of the scoring for each metric and policy are discussed thoroughly
in Note S2. An alternative weighting method as a robustness check can be
found in Notes S4–S6 and Figures S1–S3.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental information can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
oneear.2021.07.004.
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